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Abstract. We prove the correctness of a sliding window protocol with
an arbitrary ¯nite window size n and sequence numbers modulo 2n. We
show that the sliding window protocol is branching bisimilar to a queue
of capacity 2n. The proof is given entirely on the basis of an axiomatic
theory, and was checked with the help of PVS.
1 Introduction
Sliding window protocols [6] (SWPs) ensure successful transmission of messages
from a sender to a receiver through a medium, in which messages may get lost.
Their main characteristic is that the sender does not wait for an incoming ac-
knowledgement before sending next messages, for optimal use of bandwidth.
This is the reason why many data communication systems include the SWP, in
one of its many variations.
In SWPs, both the sender and the receiver maintain a bu®er. In practice the
bu®er at the receiver is often much smaller than at the sender, but here we make
the simplifying assumption that both bu®ers can contain up to n messages. By
providing the messages with sequence numbers, reliable in-order delivery without
duplications is guaranteed. The sequence numbers can be taken modulo 2n (and
not less, see [42] for a nice argument). The messages at the sender are numbered
from i to i+n (modulo 2n); this is called a window. When an acknowledgement
reaches the sender, indicating that k messages have arrived correctly, the window
slides forward, so that the sending bu®er can contain messages with sequence
numbers i+k to i+k+n (modulo 2n). The window of the receiver slides forward
when the ¯rst element in this window is passed on to the environment.
Within the process algebraic community, SWPs have attracted much atten-
tion. We provide a comparison with veri¯cations of SWPs in Section 8, and
restrict here to the context in which the current paper was written. After the
advent of process algebra in the early 80's of last century, it was observed that
simple protocols, such as the alternating bit protocol, could readily be veri¯ed. In
an attempt to show that more di±cult protocols could also be dealt with, SWPs
were considered. Middeldorp [31] and Brunekreef [4] gave speci¯cations in ACP
[1] and PSF [30], respectively. Vaandrager [43], Groenveld [12], van Wamel [44]
and Bezem and Groote [3] manually veri¯ed one-bit SWPs, in which the windowshave size one. Starting in 1990, we attempted to prove the most complex SWP
from [42] (not taking into account additional features such as duplex message
passing and piggybacking) correct using the process algebraic language ¹CRL
[16]. This turned out to be unexpectedly hard, which is shown by the 13 year
it took to ¯nish the current paper, and led to signi¯cant developments in the
realm of process algebraic proof techniques for protocol veri¯cation. We therefore
consider the current paper as a true milestone in process algebraic veri¯cation.
Our ¯rst observation was that the external behaviour of the protocol, as
given in [42], was unclear. We adapted the SWP such that it nicely behaves
as a queue of capacity 2n. The second observation was that the SWP of [42]
contained a deadlock [13, Stelling 7], which could only occur after at least n
messages were transmitted. This error was communicated to Tanenbaum, and
has been repaired in more recent editions of [42]. Another bug in the ¹CRL
speci¯cation of the SWP was detected by means of a model checking analysis.
A ¯rst attempt to prove the resulting SWP correct led to the veri¯cation of a
bakery protocol [14], and to the development of the cones and foci proof method
[19,9]. This method rephrases the question whether two system speci¯cations
are branching bisimilar in terms of proof obligations on relations between data
objects. It plays an essential role in the proof in the current paper, and has
been used to prove many other protocols and distributed algorithms correct.
But the correctness proof required an additional idea, already put forward by
Schoone [37], to ¯rst perform the proof with unbounded sequence numbers, and
to separately eliminate modulo arithmetic.
We present a speci¯cation in ¹CRL of a SWP with bu®er size 2n and win-
dow size n, for arbitrary n. The medium between the sender and the receiver
is modelled as a lossy queue of capacity one. We manually prove that the ex-
ternal behaviour of this protocol is branching bisimilar [10] to a FIFO queue
of capacity 2n. This proof is entirely based on the axiomatic theory underlying
¹CRL and the axioms characterising the data types. It implies both safety and
liveness of the protocol (the latter under the assumption of fairness). First, we
linearise the speci¯cation, meaning that we get rid of parallel operators. More-
over, communication actions are stripped from their data parameters. Then we
eliminate modulo arithmetic, using the proof principle CL-RSP [2], which states
that each linear speci¯cation has a unique solution (modulo branching bisimu-
lation). Finally, we apply the cones and foci technique, to prove that the lin-
ear speci¯cation without modulo arithmetic is branching bisimilar to a FIFO
queue of capacity 2n. All lemmas for the data types, all invariants and all cor-
rectness proofs have been checked using PVS. The PVS ¯les are available via
http://www.cwi.nl/~badban/swp.html. Ongoing research is to extend the cur-
rent veri¯cation to a setting where the medium is modelled as a lossy queue of
unbounded capacity, and to include duplex message passing and piggybacking.
In this extended abstract we omitted most equational de¯nitions of the data
types, most lemmas regarding these data types, part of the invariants and part
of the correctness proofs. The reader is referred to the full version of the paper
[8], for these de¯nitions and proofs.
22 ¹CRL
¹CRL [16] (see also [18]) is a language for specifying distributed systems and
protocols in an algebraic style. It is based on the process algebra ACP [1] ex-
tended with equational abstract data types [28]. In a ¹CRL speci¯cation, one
part speci¯es the data types, while a second part speci¯es the process behaviour.
The data types needed for our ¹CRL speci¯cation of a SWP are presented
in Section 3. In this section we focus on the process part of ¹CRL. Processes
are represented by process terms, which describe the order in which the actions
from a set A may happen. A process term consists of action names and recur-
sion variables combined by process algebraic operators. Actions and recursion
variables may carry data parameters. There are two prede¯ned actions outside
A: ± represents deadlock, and ¿ a hidden action. These two actions never carry
data parameters. p¢q denotes sequential composition and p+q non-deterministic
choice. Summation
P
d:D p(d) provides the possibly in¯nite choice over a data
type D, and the conditional construct p ¢ b ¤ q with b a data term of sort Bool
behaves as p if b and as q if :b. Parallel composition p k q interleaves the actions
of p and q; moreover, actions from p and q may also synchronise to a commu-
nication action, when this is explicitly allowed by a prede¯ned communication
function. Two actions can only synchronise if their data parameters are equal.
Encapsulation @H(p), which renames all occurrences in p of actions from the set
H into ±, can be used to force actions into communication. Hiding ¿I(p) renames
all occurrences in p of actions from the set I into ¿. Finally, processes can be
speci¯ed by means of recursive equations X(d1:D1;:::;dn:Dn) ¼ p, where X is
a recursion variable, di a data parameter of type Di for i = 1;:::;n, and p a
process term (possibly containing recursion variables and the parameters di). A
recursive speci¯cation is linear if it is of the form
X(d1:D1;:::;dn:Dn) ¼
` X
i=1
X
zi:Zi
ai(e
i
1;:::;e
i
mi)¢X(d
i
1;:::;d
i
n) / bi . ±:
To each ¹CRL speci¯cation belongs a directed graph, called a labelled tran-
sition system, which is de¯ned by the structural operational semantics of ¹CRL
(see [16]). In this labelled transition system, the states are process terms, and
the edges are labelled with parameterised actions. Branching bisimulation $b
[10] and strong bisimulation $ [33] are two well-established equivalence rela-
tions on the states in labelled transition systems. Conveniently, strong bisimula-
tion equivalence implies branching bisimulation equivalence. The proof theory of
¹CRL from [15] is sound modulo branching bisimulation equivalence, meaning
that if p ¼ q can be derived from it then p $b q.
The goal of this paper is to prove that the initial state of the forthcoming
¹CRL speci¯cation of a SWP is branching bisimilar to a FIFO queue. We use
three proof principles from the literature:
{ Sum elimination [14] states that a summation over a data type from which
only one element can be selected can be removed.
{ CL-RSP [2] states that the solutions of a linear ¹CRL speci¯cation that does
not contain any in¯nite ¿ sequence are all strongly bisimilar.
3{ The cones and foci method from [9,19] rephrases the question whether two
linear ¹CRL speci¯cations ¿I(S1) and S2 are branching bisimilar, where S2
does not contain actions from some set I of internal actions, in terms of
data equalities. A state mapping Á relates each state in S1 to a state in S2.
Furthermore, some states in S1 are declared to be focus points, by means of
a predicate FC. The cone of a focus point consists of the states in S1 that
can reach this focus point by a string of actions from I. It is required that
each reachable state in S1 is in the cone of a focus point. If a number of
matching criteria are satis¯ed, then ¿I(S1) and S2 are branching bisimilar.
3 Data Types
In this section, the data types used in the ¹CRL speci¯cation of the SWP are pre-
sented: booleans, natural numbers supplied with modulo arithmetic, and bu®ers.
Booleans and Natural Numbers. Bool is the data type of booleans. t and f denote
true and false, ^ and _ conjunction and disjunction, ! and $ implication and
logic equivalence, and : negation. For a boolean b, we abbreviate b = t to b and
b = f to :b. Unless otherwise stated, data parameters in boolean formulas are
universally quanti¯ed.
For each data type D in this paper there is an operation if : Bool£D£D ! D
with as de¯ning equations if (t;d;e) = d and if (f;d;e) = e. Furthermore, for each
data type D in this paper one can easily de¯ne a mapping eq : D £ D ! Bool
such that eq(d;e) holds if and only if d = e can be derived. For notational
convenience we take the liberty to write d = e instead of eq(d;e).
Nat is the data type of natural numbers. 0 denotes zero, S(n) the successor of
n, +,
: ¡ and ¢ addition, monus (also called proper subtraction) and multiplication,
and ·, <, ¸ and > less-than(-or-equal) and greater-than(-or-equal). Usually,
the sign for multiplication is omitted, and :(i = j) is abbreviated to i 6= j. As
binding convention, f=;6=g > f¢g > f+;
: ¡g > f·;<;¸;>g > f:g > f^;_g > f!
;$g.
Since the bu®ers at the sender and the receiver in the sliding window are of
size 2n, calculations modulo 2n play an important role. ijn denotes i modulo n,
while idiv n denotes i integer divided by n.
Bu®ers. The sender and the receiver in the SWP both maintain a bu®er contain-
ing the sending and the receiving window, respectively (outside these windows
both bu®ers are empty). Let ¢ be the set of data elements that can be commu-
nicated between sender and receiver. The bu®ers are modelled as a list of pairs
(d;i) with d 2 ¢ and i 2 Nat, representing that position (or sequence number) i
of the bu®er is occupied by datum d. The data type Buf is speci¯ed as follows,
where [] denotes the empty bu®er: [] :! Buf and in : ¢ £ Nat £ Buf ! Buf .
qjn denotes bu®er q with all sequence numbers taken modulo n. []jn = [] and
in(d;i;q)jn = in(d;ijn;qjn). test(i;q) produces t if and only if position i in q is
occupied, retrieve(i;q) produces the datum that resides at position i in bu®er q
(if this position is occupied), and remove(i;q) is obtained by emptying position
4i in bu®er q. release(i;j;q) is obtained by emptying positions i up to j excluded
in q. releasejn(i;j;q) does the same modulo n:
release(i;j;q) = if (i ¸ j;q;release(S(i);j;remove(i;q)))
releasejn(i;j;q) = if (ijn=jjn;q;releasejn(S(i);j;remove(i;q)))
next-empty(i;q) produces the ¯rst empty position in q, counting upwards from
sequence number i onward. next-emptyjn(i;q) does the same modulo n.
next-empty(i;q) = if (test(i;q);next-empty(S(i);q);i)
next-emptyjn(i;q) =
½
next-empty(ijn;qjn) if next-empty(ijn;qjn) < n
next-empty(0;qjn) otherwise
Intuitively, in-window(i;j;k) produces t if and only if j lies in the range from i
to k
: ¡ 1, modulo n, where n is greater than i, j and k.
in-window(i;j;k) = i · j < k _ k < i · j _ j < k < i
Lists. The data type List of lists is used in the speci¯cation of the desired
external behaviour of the SWP: a FIFO queue of capacity 2n. It is speci¯ed
by the empty list hi :! List and in : ¢ £ List ! List. length(¸) denotes the
length of ¸, top(¸) produces the datum at the top of ¸, tail(¸) is obtained by
removing the top position in ¸, append(d;¸) adds datum d at the end of ¸, and
¸+ +¸0 represents list concatenation. Furthermore, q[i::ji is the list containing the
elements in bu®er q at positions i up to but not including j. An empty position
in q, in between i and j, gives rise to an occurrence of the default datum d0 in
q[i::ji.
q[i::ji =
8
<
:
hi if i ¸ j
in(retrieve(i;q);q[S(i)::ji) if i < j ^ test(i;q)
in(d0;q[S(i)::ji) if i < j ^ :test(i;q)
4 Sliding Window Protocol
In this section, a ¹CRL speci¯cation of a SWP is presented, together with its
desired external behaviour.
Speci¯cation of a Sliding Window Protocol. A sender S stores data elements
that it receives via channel A in a bu®er of size 2n, in the order in which they
are received. S can send a datum, together with its sequence number in the
bu®er, to a receiver R via a medium that behaves as lossy queue of capacity
one, represented by the medium K and the channels B and C. Upon reception,
R may store the datum in its bu®er, where its position in the bu®er is dictated
by the attached sequence number. In order to avoid a possible overlap between
the sequence numbers of di®erent data elements in the bu®ers of S and R, no
more than one half of the bu®ers of S and R may be occupied at any time; these
5halves are called the sending and the receiving window, respectively. R can pass
on a datum that resides at the ¯rst position in its window via channel D; in
that case the receiving window slides forward by one position. Furthermore, R
can send the sequence number of the ¯rst empty position in (or just outside) its
window as an acknowledgement to S via a medium that behaves as lossy queue
of capacity one, represented by the medium L and the channels E and F. If S
receives this acknowledgement, its window slides accordingly.
L
B
E
D
C
F
K
R S
A
0
1
2
0
1
2
¢¢¢ ¢¢¢
2n¡1
2n¡2
2n¡3
¢¢¢ ¢¢¢
2n¡1
2n¡2
2n¡3
The sender S is modelled by the process S(`;m;q), where q is a bu®er of size
2n, ` the ¯rst position in the sending window, and m the ¯rst empty position in
(or just outside) the sending window. Data elements can be selected at random
for transmission from (the ¯lled part of) the sending window.
S(`:Nat;m:Nat;q:Buf )
¼
P
d:¢ rA(d)¢S(`;S(m)j2n;in(d;m;q)) / in-window(`;m;(` + n)j2n) . ±
+
P
k:Nat sB(retrieve(k;q);k)¢S(`;m;q) / test(k;q) . ±
+
P
k:Nat rF(k)¢S(k;m;releasej2n(`;k;q))
The receiver R is modelled by the process R(`0;q0), where q0 is a bu®er of size
2n and `0 the ¯rst position in the receiving window.
R(`
0:Nat;q
0:Buf )
¼
P
d:¢
P
k:Nat rC(d;k)¢(R(`
0;in(d;k;q
0)) / in-window(`
0;k;(`
0 + n)j2n) . R(`
0;q
0))
+ sD(retrieve(`
0;q
0))¢R(S(`
0)j2n;remove(`
0;q
0)) / test(`
0;q
0) . ±
+ sE(next-emptyj2n(`
0;q
0))¢R(`
0;q
0)
For i 2 fB;C;E;Fg, si and ri can communicate, resulting in ci.
Finally, the mediums K and L, which have capacity one, may lose frames
between S and R. The action j indicates an internal choice.
K ¼
P
d:¢
P
k:Nat rB(d;k)¢(j¢sC(d;k) + j)¢K
L ¼
P
k:Nat rE(k)¢(j¢sF(k) + j)¢L
6The initial state of the SWP is expressed by ¿I(@H(S(0;0;[]) k R(0;[]) k
K k L)), where the set H consists of the read and send actions over the internal
channels B, C, E, and F, while the set I consists of the communication actions
over these internal channels together with j.
External Behaviour. Data elements that are read from channel A by S should be
sent into channel D by R in the same order, and no data elements should be lost.
In other words, the SWP is intended to be a solution for the linear speci¯cation
Z(¸:List) ¼
P
d:¢ rA(d)¢Z(append(d;¸)) / length(¸) < 2n . ±
+ sD(top(¸))¢Z(tail(¸)) / length(¸) > 0 . ±
Note that rA(d) can be performed until the list ¸ contains 2n elements, because
in that situation the sending and receiving windows will be ¯lled. Furthermore,
sD(top(¸)) can only be performed if ¸ is not empty.
The remainder of this paper is devoted to proving the following theorem.
Theorem 1. ¿I(@H(S(0;0;[]) k R(0;[]) k K k L)) $b Z(hi).
5 Transformations of the Speci¯cation
The starting point of our correctness proof is a linear speci¯cation Nmod, in
which no parallel operators occur. Nmod can be obtained from the ¹CRL spec-
i¯cation of the SWP without the hiding operator, by means of a linearisa-
tion algorithm presented in [17]. Nmod contains ¯ve extra parameters: e:D and
g;g0;h;h0:Nat. Intuitively, g (resp. g0) equals zero when medium K (resp. L) is
inactive, equals one when K (resp. L) just received a datum, and equals two if
K (resp. L) decides to pass on this datum. Furthermore, e (resp. h) equals the
datum that is being sent from S to R (resp. the position of this datum in the
sending window) while g 6= 0, and equals the dummy value d0 (resp. 0) while
g = 0. Finally h0 equals the ¯rst empty position in the receiving window while
g0 6= 0 and equals 0 while g0 = 0. Furthermore, data arguments are stripped from
communication actions, and these actions are renamed to a fresh action c. For
the sake of presentation, we only present parameters whose values are changed.
Nmod(`:Nat;m:Nat;q:Buf ;`
0:Nat;q
0:Buf ;g:Nat;e:D;h:Nat;g
0:Nat;h
0:Nat)
¼
P
d:¢ rA(d)¢Nmod(m:=S(m)j2n;q:=in(d;m;q)) / in-window(`;m;(` + n)j2n) . ±
+
P
k:Nat c¢Nmod(g:=1;e:=retrieve(k;q);h:=k) / test(k;q) ^ g = 0 . ±
+ j¢Nmod(g:=0;e:=d0;h:=0) / g = 1 . ±
+ j¢Nmod(g:=2) / g = 1 . ±
+ c¢Nmod(q
0:=in(e;h;q
0);g:=0;e:=d0;h:=0) / in-window(`
0;h;(`
0 + n)j2n) ^ g = 2 . ±
+ c¢Nmod(g:=0;e:=d0;h:=0) / :in-window(`
0;h;(`
0 + n)j2n) ^ g = 2 . ±
+ sD(retrieve(`
0;q
0))¢Nmod(`
0:=S(`
0)j2n;q
0:=remove(`
0;q
0)) / test(`
0;q
0) . ±
+ c¢Nmod(g
0:=1;h
0:=next-emptyj2n(`
0;q
0)) / g
0 = 0 . ±
+ j¢Nmod(g
0:=0;h
0:=0) / g
0 = 1 . ±
+ j¢Nmod(g
0:=2) / g
0 = 1 . ±
+ c¢Nmod(`:=h
0;q:=releasej2n(`;h
0;q);g
0:=0;h
0:=0) / g
0 = 2 . ±
7Theorem 2.
¿I(@H(S(0;0;[]) k R(0;[]) k K k L)) $ ¿fc;jg(Nmod(0;0;[];0;[];0;d0;0;0;0)):
The speci¯cation of Nnonmod is obtained by eliminating all occurrences of
j2n from Nmod, and replacing in-window(`;m;(` + n)j2n by m < ` + n and
in-window(`0;h;(`0 + n)j2n by `0 · h < `0 + n.
Theorem 3. Nmod(0;0;[];0;[];0;d0;0;0;0) $ Nnonmod(0;0;[];0;[];0;d0;0;0;0):
The proof of Theorem 2, using a linearisation algorithm [17] and a simple
renaming, is omitted. The proof of Theorem 3 is shown in Section 7.1.
6 Properties of Data and Invariants of Nnonmod
Lemma 1 collects results on modulo arithmetic related to bu®ers. Simpler lem-
mas on modulo arithmetic, bu®ers, the next-empty operation, and lists can be
found in the full version of this paper [8]. We use those lemmas without mention.
Lemma 1. The lemmas below hold for modulo arithmetic related to bu®ers.
1. 8j:Nat(test(j;q) ! i · j < i + n) ^ i · k · i + n ! test(k;q) = test(kj2n;qj2n)
2. 8j:Nat(test(j;q) ! i · j < i+n)^test(k;q) ! retrieve(k;q) = retrieve(kj2n;qj2n)
3. i · k < i + n ! in-window(ij2n;kj2n;(i + n)j2n)
4. in-window(ij2n;kj2n;(i + n)j2n) ! k + n < i _ i · k < i + n _ k ¸ i + 2n
5. 8j:Nat(test(j;q) ! i · j < i + n) ^ test(k;qj2n) ! in-window(ij2n;k;(i + n)j2n)
Invariants of a system are properties of data that are satis¯ed throughout the
reachable state space of the system. Lemma 2 collects 9 invariants of Nnonmod
that are needed in the correctness proofs in the current paper.
Lemma 2. The invariants below hold for Nnonmod(`;m;q;`
0;q
0;g;e;h;g
0;h
0).
1. maxfh
0;`g · next-empty(`
0;q
0)
2. g 6= 0 ! h < m
3. next-empty(`
0;q
0) · minfm;`
0 + ng
4. test(i;q) $ ` · i < m
5. ` · m · ` + n · `
0 + 2n
6. g 6= 0 ! next-empty(`
0;q
0) · h + n
7. g 6= 0 ^ test(h;q) ! retrieve(h;q) = e
8. g 6= 0 ^ test(h;q
0) ! retrieve(h;q
0) = e
9. ` · i ^ j · next-empty(i;q
0) ! q[i::ji = q
0[i::ji
7 Correctness of Nmod
7.1 Equality of Nmod and Nnonmod
In this section we present a proof of Theorem 3. It su±ces to prove that for all
`;m;`0;h;h0 : Nat, q;q0 : Buf , e : ¢ and g;g0 · 2,
Nmod(`j2n;mj2n;qj2n;`0j2n;q0j2n;g;e;hj2n;g0;h0j2n)
$ Nnonmod(`j2n;mj2n;qj2n;`0j2n;q0j2n;g;e;hj2n;g0;h0j2n)
8Proof. We show that Nmod(`j2n;mj2n;qj2n;`
0j2n;q
0j2n;g;e;hj2n;g
0;h
0j2n) is a solution
for the de¯ning equation of Nnonmod(`;m;q;`
0;q
0;g;e;h;g
0;h
0). Hence, we must derive
the following equation.
Nmod(`j2n;mj2n;qj2n;`
0j2n;q
0j2n;g;e;hj2n;g
0;h
0j2n)
¼
P
d:¢ rA(d)¢Nmod(m:=S(m)j2n;q:=in(d;m;q)j2n) / m < ` + n . ± (A)
+
P
k:Nat c¢Nmod(g:=1;e:=retrieve(k;q);h:=kj2n) / test(k;q) ^ g = 0 . ± (B)
+ j¢Nmod(g:=0;e:=d0;h:=0) / g = 1 . ± (C)
+ j¢Nmod(g:=2) / g = 1 . ± (D)
+ c¢Nmod(q
0:=in(e;h;q
0)j2n;g:=0;e:=d0;h:=0) / `
0 · h < `
0 + n ^ g = 2 . ± (E)
+ c¢Nmod(g:=0;e:=d0;h:=0) / :(`
0 · h < `
0 + n) ^ g = 2 . ± (F)
+ sD(retrieve(`
0;q
0))¢Nmod(`
0:=S(`
0)j2n;q
0:=remove(`
0;q
0)j2n) / test(`
0;q
0) . ± (G)
+ c¢Nmod(g
0:=1;h
0:=next-empty(`
0;q
0)j2n) / g
0 = 0 . ± (H)
+ j¢Nmod(g
0:=0;h
0:=0) / g
0 = 1 . ± (I)
+ j¢Nmod(g
0:=2) / g
0 = 1 . ± (J)
+ c¢Nmod(`:=h
0j2n;q:=release(`;h
0;q)j2n;g
0:=0;h
0:=0) / g
0 = 2 . ± (K)
In order to prove this, we instantiate the parameters in the de¯ning equation of
Nmod with `j2n;mj2n;qj2n;`
0j2n;q
0j2n;g;e;hj2n;g
0;h
0j2n.
Nmod(`j2n;mj2n;qj2n;`
0j2n;q
0j2n;g;e;hj2n;g
0;h
0j2n)
¼
P
d:¢ rA(d)¢Nmod(m:=S(mj2n)j2n;q:=in(d;mj2n;qj2n))
/ in-window(`j2n;mj2n;(`j2n + n)j2n) . ±
+
P
k:Nat c¢Nmod(g:=1;e:=retrieve(k;qj2n);h:=k) / test(k;qj2n) ^ g = 0 . ±
+ j¢Nmod(g:=0;e:=d0;h:=0) / g = 1 . ±
+ j¢Nmod(g:=2) / g = 1 . ±
+ c¢Nmod(q
0:=in(e;hj2n;q
0j2n);g:=0;e:=d0;h:=0)
/ in-window(`
0j2n;hj2n;(`
0j2n + n)j2n) ^ g = 2 . ±
+ c¢Nmod(g:=0;e:=d0;h:=0)
/ :in-window(`
0j2n;hj2n;(`
0j2n + n)j2n) ^ g = 2 . ±
+ sD(retrieve(`
0j2n;q
0j2n))¢Nmod(`
0:=S(`
0j2n)j2n;q
0:=remove(`
0j2n;q
0j2n))
/ test(`
0j2n;q
0j2n) . ±
+ c¢Nmod(g
0:=1;h
0:=next-emptyj2n(`
0j2n;q
0j2n)) / g
0 = 0 . ±
+ j¢Nmod(g
0:=0;h
0:=0) / g
0 = 1 . ±
+ j¢Nmod(g
0:=2) / g
0 = 1 . ±
+ c¢Nmod(`:=h
0j2n;q:=releasej2n(`j2n;h
0j2n;qj2n);g
0:=0;h
0:=0) / g
0 = 2 . ±
To equate the eleven summands in both speci¯cations, we obtain a number of proof
obligations. Here, we focus on summands A, B, and E.
A m < ` + n = in-window(`j2n;mj2n;(`j2n + n)j2n).
m < ` + n $ ` · m < ` + n (Inv. 2.5) ! in-window(`j2n;mj2n;(` + n)j2n)
(Lem. 1.3). Reversely, in-window(`j2n;mj2n;(` + n)j2n) ! m+n < `_` · m < `+
n_m ¸ `+2n (Lem. 1.4) $ m < `+n (Inv. 2.5). Since (` + n)j2n = (`j2n + n)j2n,
we have m < ` + n = in-window(`j2n;mj2n;(`j2n + n)j2n).
9B Below we equate the entire summand B of the two speci¯cations. The conjunc-
tion g = 0 and the argument g:=1 of summand B are omitted, because they are
irrelevant for this derivation.
By Inv. 2.4 and 2.5, test(j;q) ! ` · j < `+n. So by Lem. 1.5, test(k
0;qj2n) implies
in-window(`j2n;k
0;(` + n)j2n). test(k
0;qj2n) implies k
0 = k
0j2n, and by Lem. 1.4,
k
0 + n < `j2n _ `j2n · k
0 < `j2n + n _ k
0 ¸ ` + 2n. k
0 = k
0j2n < 2n implies
k
0 + n < `j2n _ `j2n · k
0 < `j2n + n.
P
k:Nat c¢Nmod(e:=retrieve(k;q);h:=kj2n)
/ test(k;q) . ±
¼
P
k:Nat c¢Nmod(e:=retrieve(k;q);h:=kj2n)
/ test(k;q) ^ ` · k < ` + n . ± (Inv. 2.4, 2.5)
¼
P
k:Nat c¢Nmod(e:=retrieve(kj2n;qj2n);h:=kj2n)
/ test(kj2n;qj2n) ^ ` · k < ` + n . ± (Lem. 1.1, 1.2)
¼
P
k0:Nat
P
k:Nat c¢Nmod(e:=retrieve(k
0;qj2n);h:=k
0)
/ test(k
0;qj2n) ^ ` · k < ` + n ^ k
0 = kj2n . ± (sum elimination)
¼
P
k0:Nat
P
k:Nat c¢Nmod(e:=retrieve(k
0;qj2n);h:=k
0)
/ test(k
0;qj2n) ^ k = (`div 2n)2n + k
0 ^ `j2n · k
0 < `j2n + n ^ k
0 = kj2n . ±
+
P
k0:Nat
P
k:Nat c¢Nmod(e:=retrieve(k
0;qj2n);h:=k
0)
/ test(k
0;qj2n) ^ k = S(`div 2n)2n + k
0 ^ k
0 + n < `j2n ^ k
0 = kj2n . ±
¼
P
k0:Nat c¢Nmod(e:=retrieve(k
0;qj2n);h:=k
0)
/ test(k
0;qj2n) ^ `j2n · k
0 < `j2n + n ^ k
0 = k
0 . ±
+
P
k0:Nat c¢Nmod(e:=retrieve(k
0;qj2n);h:=k
0)
/ test(k
0;qj2n) ^ k
0 + n < `j2n ^ k
0 = k
0 . ± (sum elimination)
¼
P
k0:Nat c¢Nmod(e:=retrieve(k
0;qj2n);h:=k
0)
/ test(k
0;qj2n) . ± (see above)
E g = 2 ! `
0 · h < `
0 + n = in-window(`
0j2n;hj2n;(`
0 + n)j2n).
Let g = 2. We have `
0 · next-empty(`
0;q
0), and by Inv. 2.6 together with g = 2,
next-empty(`
0;q
0) · h + n, so `
0 · h + n. Furthermore, by Inv. 2.2 together with
g = 2, h < m, by Inv. 2.5, m · `
0 +2n. Hence, h < `
0 +2n. So using Lem. 1.3 and
1.4, it follows that `
0 · h < `
0 + n = in-window(`
0j2n;hj2n;(`
0 + n)j2n).
Equality of other summands can be derived without much di±culty. Hence, we prove
that Nmod(`j2n;mj2n;qj2n;`
0j2n;q
0j2n;g;e;hj2n;g
0;h
0j2n) is a solution for the speci¯ca-
tion of Nnonmod(`;m;q;`
0;q
0;g;e;h;g
0;h
0). By CL-RSP, they are strongly bisimilar.
7.2 Correctness of Nnonmod
We prove that Nnonmod is branching bisimilar to the FIFO queue Z of capacity
2n (see Section 4), using the cones and foci method [9].
Let ¥ abbreviate Nat £Nat £Buf £Nat £Buf £Nat £¢£Nat £Nat £Nat.
Furthermore, let »:¥ denote (`;m;q;`0;q0;g;e;h;g0;h0). The state mapping Á :
¥ ! List, which maps states of Nnonmod to states of Z, is de¯ned by:
Á(») = q
0[`
0::next-empty(`
0;q
0)i+ +q[next-empty(`
0;q
0)::mi
Intuitively, Á collects the data elements in the sending and receiving windows,
starting at the ¯rst position of the receiving window (i.e., `0) until the ¯rst empty
10position in this window, and then continuing in the sending window until the
¯rst empty position in that window (i.e., m). Note that Á is independent of
e;g;`;h;g0;h0; we therefore write Á(m;q;`0;q0).
The focus points are those states where either the sending window is empty
(meaning that ` = m), or the receiving window is full and all data elements in
the receiving window have been acknowledged, meaning that ` = `0 + n. That
is, the focus condition for Nnonmod(`;m;q;`0;q0;g;e;h;g0;h0) is
FC(`;m;q;`
0;q
0;g;e;h;g
0;h
0) := ` = m _ ` = `
0 + n
Lemma 3. For each »:¥ where the invariants in Lemma 2 hold, there is a ^ »:¥ with
FC(^ ») such that Nnonmod(»)
c1 ! ¢¢¢
cn ! Nnonmod(^ »), where c1;:::;cn 2 I.
Proof. In case g 6= 0 in », by summands C, E and F, we can perform one or two commu-
nication actions to a state where g = 0. By Inv. 2.3, next-empty(`
0;q
0) · minfm;`
0+ng.
We prove by induction on minfm;`
0+ng¡next-empty(`
0;q
0) that for each state »
0 where
g = 0 and the invariants in Lemma 2 hold, a focus point can be reached.
Base Case: next-empty(`
0;q
0) = minfm;`
0 + ng.
In case g
0 6= 0 in »
0, by summands I and K, we can perform communication actions
to a state where g
0 = 0 and next-empty(`
0;q
0) = minfm;`
0 + ng. By summands H,
J and K we can perform three communication actions to a state ^ » where ` = h
0 =
next-empty(`
0;q
0) = minfm;`
0 + ng. Then ` = m or ` = `
0 + n, so FC(^ »).
Induction Case: next-empty(`
0;q
0) < minfm;`
0 + ng.
By Inv. 2.1, ` · next-empty(`
0;q
0) < m. By Inv. 2.4, test(next-empty(`
0;q
0);q). Further-
more, `
0 · next-empty(`;q
0) < `
0 +n. Hence, by summands B, D and E from »
0 we can
perform three communication actions to a state »
00. In »
00, g := 0, and in comparison to
»
0, m and `
0 remain the same, while q
0 := in(d;next-empty(`
0;q
0);q
0) where d denotes
retrieve(next-empty(`
0;q
0);q). Since next-empty(`
0;in(d;next-empty(`
0;q
0);q
0))
= next-empty(S(next-empty(`
0;q
0));q
0) > next-empty(`
0;q
0), we can apply the induc-
tion hypothesis to conclude that from »
00 a focus point can be reached.
Theorem 4. For all e:¢, ¿fc;jg(Nnonmod(0;0;[];0;[];0;e;0;0;0)) $b Z(hi).
Proof. By the cones and foci method we obtain the following matching criteria (cf.
[9]). Trivial matching criteria are left out.
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > :
I:1 : `
0 · h < `
0 + n ^ g = 2 ! Á(m;q;`
0;q
0) = Á(m;q;`
0;in(e;h;q
0))
I:2 : g
0 = 2 ! Á(m;q;`
0;q
0) = Á(m;release(`;h
0;q);`
0;q
0)
II:1 : m < ` + n ! length(Á(m;q;`
0;q
0)) < 2n
II:2 : test(`
0;q
0) ! length(Á(m;q;`
0;q
0)) > 0
III:1 : (` = m _ ` = `
0 + n) ^ length(Á(m;q;`
0;q
0)) < 2n ! m < ` + n
III:2 : (` = m _ ` = `
0 + n) ^ length(Á(m;q;`
0;q
0)) > 0 ! test(`
0;q
0)
IV : test(`
0;q
0) ! retrieve(`
0;q
0) = top(Á(m;q;`
0;q
0))
V:1 : m < ` + n ! Á(S(m);in(d;m;q);`
0;q
0) = append(d;Á(m;q;`
0;q
0))
V:2 : test(`
0;q
0) ! Á(m;q;S(`
0);remove(`
0;q
0)) = tail(Á(m;q;`
0;q
0))
I.1 `
0 · h < `
0 + n ^ g = 2 ! Á(m;q;`
0;q
0) = Á(m;q;`
0;in(e;h;q
0)).
Case 1: h 6= next-empty(`
0;q
0)).
Let g = 2. Since next-empty(`
0;in(e;h;q
0)) = next-empty(`
0;q
0), it follows that
Á(m;q;`
0;in(e;h;q
0)) = in(e;h;q
0)[`
0::next-empty(`
0;q
0)i+ +q[next-empty(`
0;q
0)::mi.
11Case 1.1: `
0 · h < next-empty(`
0;q
0)).
test(h;q
0), so by Inv. 2.8 together with g = 2, retrieve(h;q
0) = e. Hence,
in(e;h;q
0)[`
0::next-empty(`
0;q
0)i = q
0[`
0::next-empty(`
0;q
0)i.
Case 1.2: :(`
0 · h · next-empty(`
0;q
0)).
in(e;h;q
0)[`
0::next-empty(`
0;q
0)i = q
0[`
0::next-empty(`
0;q
0)i.
Case 2: h = next-empty(`
0;q
0).
Let g = 2. The derivation splits into two parts.
(1) in(e;h;q
0)[`
0::hi = q
0[`
0::hi.
(2) By Inv. 2.1, ` · h, and by Inv. 2.2 together with g = 2, h < m. Thus, by Inv. 2.4,
test(h;q). So by Inv. 2.7 together with g = 2, retrieve(h;q) = e. Hence,
in(e;h;q
0)[h::next-empty(S(h);q
0)i
= in(e;in(e;h;q
0)[S(h)::next-empty(S(h);q
0)i)
= in(e;q
0[S(h)::next-empty(S(h);q
0)i)
= in(e;q[S(h)::next-empty(S(h);q
0)i) (Inv. 2.9)
= q[h::next-empty(S(h);q
0)i
Finally, we combine (1) and (2). We recall that h = next-empty(`
0;q
0).
in(e;h;q
0)[`
0::next-empty(`
0;in(e;h;q
0))i
+ +q[next-empty(`
0;in(e;h;q
0))::mi
= in(e;h;q
0)[`
0::next-empty(S(h);q
0)i
+ +q[next-empty(S(h);q
0)::mi
= (in(e;h;q
0)[`
0::hi+ +in(e;h;q
0)[h::next-empty(S(h);q
0)i)
+ +q[next-empty(S(h);q
0)::mi
= q
0[`
0::hi+ +q[h::next-empty(S(h);q
0)i
+ +q[next-empty(S(h);q
0)::mi (1), (2)
= q
0[`
0::hi+ +q[h::mi
I.2 g
0 = 2 ! Á(m;q;`
0;q
0) = Á(m;release(`;h
0;q);`
0;q
0).
By Inv. 2.1, h
0 · next-empty(`
0;q
0).
So release(`;h
0;q)[next-empty(`
0;q
0)::mi = q
0[next-empty(`
0;q
0)::mi.
II.1 m < ` + n ! length(Á(m;q;`
0;q
0)) < 2n.
Let m < ` + n. By Inv. 2.3, next-empty(`
0;q
0) · `
0 + n. Hence,
length(q
0[`
0::next-empty(`
0;q
0)i+ +q[next-empty(`
0;q
0)::mi)
= length(q
0[`
0::next-empty(`
0;q
0)i) + length(q[next-empty(`
0;q
0)::mi))
= (next-empty(`
0;q
0)
: ¡ `
0) + (m
: ¡ next-empty(`
0;q
0))
· n + (m
: ¡ `) (Inv. 2.1)
< 2n
II.2 test(`
0;q
0) ! length(Á(m;q;`
0;q
0)) > 0.
test(`
0;q
0) yields next-empty(`
0;q
0) = next-empty(S(`
0);q
0) ¸ S(`
0). Hence,
length(Á(m;q;`
0;q
0)) = (next-empty(`
0;q
0)
: ¡ `
0) + (m
: ¡ next-empty(`
0;q
0)) > 0.
III.1 (` = m _ ` = `
0 + n) ^ length(Á(m;q;`
0;q
0)) < 2n ! m < ` + n.
Case 1: ` = m.
Then m < ` + n holds trivially.
Case 2: ` = `
0 + n.
By Inv. 2.3, next-empty(`
0;q
0) · `
0 + n. Hence,
length(Á(m;q;`
0;q
0))
= (next-empty(`
0;q
0)
: ¡ `
0) + (m
: ¡ next-empty(`
0;q
0))
· ((`
0 + n)
: ¡ `
0) + (m
: ¡ `) (Inv. 2.1)
= n + (m
: ¡ `)
12So length(Á(m;q;`
0;q
0)) < 2n implies m < ` + n.
III.2 (` = m _ ` = `
0 + n) ^ length(Á(m;q;`
0;q
0)) > 0 ! test(`
0;q
0).
Case 1: ` = m.
Since m
: ¡ next-empty(`
0;q
0) · (m
: ¡ `) (Inv. 2.1) = 0, we have
length(Á(m;q;`
0;q
0)) = next-empty(`
0;q
0)
: ¡ `
0.
Hence, length(Á(m;q;`
0;q
0)) > 0 yields next-empty(`
0;q
0) > `
0, which implies
test(`
0;q
0).
Case 2: ` = `
0 + n.
Then by Inv. 2.1, next-empty(`
0;q
0) ¸ `
0 + n, which implies test(`
0;q
0).
IV test(`
0;q
0) ! retrieve(`
0;q
0) = top(Á(m;q;`
0;q
0)).
test(`
0;q
0) implies next-empty(`
0;q
0) = next-empty(S(`
0);q
0) ¸ S(`
0).
So q
0[`
0::next-empty(`
0;q
0)i = in(retrieve(`
0;q
0);q
0[S(`
0)::next-empty(`
0;q
0)i).
Hence, top(Á(m;q;`
0;q
0)) = retrieve(`
0;q
0).
V.1 m < ` + n ! Á(S(m);in(d;m;q);`
0;q
0) = append(d;Á(m;q;`
0;q
0)).
q
0[`
0::next-empty(`
0;q
0)i+ +in(d;m;q)[next-empty(`
0;q
0)::S(m)i
= q
0[`
0::next-empty(`
0;q
0)i+ +append(d;q[next-empty(`
0;q
0)::mi)
= append(d;q
0[`
0::next-empty(`
0;q
0)i+ +q[next-empty(`
0;q
0)::mi)
V.2 test(`
0;q
0) ! Á(m;q;S(`
0);remove(`
0;q
0)) = tail(Á(m;q;`
0;q
0)).
test(`
0;q
0) implies next-empty(`
0;q
0) = next-empty(S(`
0);q
0). Hence,
remove(`
0;q
0)[S(`
0)::next-empty(S(`
0);remove(`
0;q
0))i
+ +q[next-empty(S(`
0);remove(`
0;q
0))::mi
= remove(`
0;q
0)[S(`
0)::next-empty(S(`
0);q
0)i+ +q[next-empty(S(`
0);q
0)::mi
= remove(`
0;q
0)[S(`
0)::next-empty(`
0;q
0)i+ +q[next-empty(`
0;q
0)::mi
= q
0[S(`
0)::next-empty(`
0;q
0)i+ +q[next-empty(`
0;q
0)::mi
= tail(q
0[`
0::next-empty(`
0;q
0)i+ +q[next-empty(`
0;q
0)::mi)
7.3 Correctness of the Sliding Window Protocol
Finally, we can prove Theorem 1.
Proof.
¿I(@H(S(0;0;[]) k R(0;[]) k K k L))
$ ¿fc;jg(Nmod(0;0;[];0;[];0;d0;0;0;0)) (Thm. 2)
$ ¿fc;jg(Nnonmod(0;0;[];0;[];0;d0;0;0;0)) (Thm. 3)
$b Z(hi) (Thm. 4)
8 Related Work
Sliding window protocols have attracted considerable interest from the formal
veri¯cation community. In this section we present an overview. Many of these
veri¯cations deal with unbounded sequence numbers, in which case modulo arith-
metic is avoided, or with a ¯xed ¯nite window size. The papers that do treat
arbitrary ¯nite window sizes mostly restrict to safety properties.
13In¯nite window size. Stenning [41] studied a SWP with unbounded sequence
numbers and an in¯nite window size, in which messages can be lost, duplicated
or reordered. A timeout mechanism is used to trigger retransmission. Stenning
gave informal manual proofs of some safety properties. Knuth [26] examined more
general principles behind Stenning's protocol, and manually veri¯ed some safety
properties. Hailpern [20] used temporal logic to formulate safety and liveness
properties for Stenning's protocol, and established their validity by informal
reasoning. Jonsson [23] also veri¯ed both safety and liveness properties of the
protocol, using temporal logic and a manual compositional veri¯cation technique.
Fixed ¯nite window size. Richier et al. [34] speci¯ed a SWP in a process algebra
based language Estelle/R, and veri¯ed safety properties for window size up to
eight using the model checker Xesar. Madelaine and Vergamini [29] speci¯ed
a SWP in Lotos, with the help of the simulation environment Lite, and proved
some safety properties for window size six. Holzmann [21,22] used the Spin model
checker to verify both safety and liveness properties of a SWP with sequence
numbers up to ¯ve. Kaivola [25] veri¯ed safety and liveness properties using
model checking for a SWP with window size up to seven. Godefroid and Long
[11] speci¯ed a full duplex SWP in a guarded command language, and veri¯ed the
protocol for window size two using a model checker based on Queue BDDs. Stahl
et al. [40] used a combination of abstraction, data independence, compositional
reasoning and model checking to verify safety and liveness properties for a SWP
with window size up to sixteen. The protocol was speci¯ed in Promela, the input
language for the Spin model checker. Smith and Klarlund [38] speci¯ed a SWP
in the high-level language IOA, and used the theorem prover MONA to verify
a safety property for unbounded sequence numbers with window size up to 256.
Latvala [27] modeled a SWP using Colored Petri nets. A liveness property was
model checked with fairness constraints for window size up to eleven.
Arbitrary ¯nite window size. Cardell-Oliver [5] speci¯ed a SWP using higher or-
der logic, and manually proved and mechanically checked safety properties using
HOL. (Van de Snepscheut [39] noted that what Cardell-Oliver claims to be a live-
ness property is in fact a safety property.) Schoone [37] manually proved safety
properties for several SWPs using assertional veri¯cation. Van de Snepscheut
[39] gave a correctness proof of a SWP as a sequence of correctness preserving
transformations of a sequential program. Paliwoda and Sanders [32] speci¯ed
a reduced version of what they call a SWP (but which is in fact very similar
to the bakery protocol from [14]) in the process algebra CSP, and veri¯ed a
safety property modulo trace semantics. RÄ ockl and Esparza [35] veri¯ed the cor-
rectness of this bakery protocol modulo weak bisimulation using Isabelle/HOL,
by explicitly checking a bisimulation relation. Jonsson and Nilsson [24] used an
automated reachability analysis to verify safety properties for a SWP with ar-
bitrary sending window size and receiving window size one. Rusu [36] used the
theorem prover PVS to verify both safety and liveness properties for a SWP with
unbounded sequence numbers. Chkliaev et al. [7] used a timed state machine in
14PVS to specify a SWP in which messages can be lost, duplicated or reordered,
and proved some safety properties with the mechanical support of PVS.
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